Policing cybercrime: a need for dedicated investigation and coordination within the criminal justice system by Rush III, Robert
 
 
The Bill Blackwood 














A Need for Dedicated Investigation and Coordination within the 












A Leadership White Paper 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
Required for Graduation from the 
















Killeen Police Department 




Cybercrime is an enormous problem, the scope of which the criminal justice 
system does not really know. That scope is lacking because the term has yet to be 
clearly defined, let alone developed to standardize legal statutes and institutional means 
to combat it. Archaic laws, outdated concepts of the instruments of these crimes, and a 
lack of training and investigative resources is causing law enforcement to fall further 
behind in policing this aspect of criminality. Poor communication and jurisdictional 
boundaries that are only kept by crime fighters and legislators compound the problem. 
This is relevant because of the ever-increasing digitalization of human lives. Virtually 
everything that humans can accomplish using a computer or network can be criminally 
exploited, and law enforcement has not kept pace with that exploitation. For that reason, 
law enforcement agencies should make an effort to dedicate resources to understanding 
and investigating cybercrime, as well as coordination with other criminal                 
justice entities in order to increase the solvability of these cases. 
Law enforcement needs to establish what cybercrime is, how to investigate it, 
how to prosecute it, and what tools are available to accomplish those goals. There is a 
need for communication and coordination across all jurisdictional lines to charge 
offenders who ignore those same boundaries, as well as a need to solicit buy-in and 
assistance from stakeholders and potential victims, in order to harden targets against 
these crimes and hopefully prevent some of them. 
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Cybercrime is not a new problem, but it is an enormous one. It is not likely to 
diminish or disappear as the world moves toward more networked connectivity and 
dependence on technology for everything from bills to entertainment, from education to 
social interaction. As technology changes, criminal statutes have lagged behind 
(“Disorderly Conduct,” 2013), as has the ability of law enforcement officers to 
investigate and resolve offenses committed via technological means. 
Cybercrime itself is difficult to define, but the prevailing idea is that it encompasses a 
group of offenses where computers or networks are targeted for criminal activity, such 
as a DDOS (distributed denial of service) attack, property crimes such as identity theft 
or credit card fraud where computers and/or networks are the means by which the 
crimes are perpetrated, or crimes against persons where computers or networks are 
merely used to cause some harm to others (Fair, 2005). The two most well known 
examples of this last form of cybercrime are cyber harassment and cyberbullying. Other 
more recently developed forms of cybercrime could include online impersonation, 
whereby a person pretends to be an existing person for the creation of online profiles, 
social media accounts, or even messaging, causing harm or distress without 
necessarily causing pecuniary loss (“Computer Crimes,” 2013). 
One significant problem with cybercrime is that the scope of the problem itself is 
difficult to determine. This is partially due to offenses being unreported (as in the case of 
reluctant victims of cyberharassment/bullying), and the difficulty in separating fraud 
cases perpetrated by means of computers and networks from those titled identically but 





maintains statistics on the prevalence of this offense, the percentage of these crimes 
definitely committed by using computers or networks is not clear (Harrell, 2013). 
Sometimes these offenses can be reported to law enforcement, but the elements of a 
statute cannot be proven given available information, and the investigative means by 
which we might prove that the offense even occurred are not available, due to the 
evidentiary burden required to access those means. All law enforcement has is a vague 
and uneasy sense that the problem is huge, and it is growing, and that the means 
available to investigate and charge offenders seems to be lacking. 
The stakes are increasing as well, both in terms of pecuniary loss and the human 
element to this type of crime. Aside from the prolific fraud, harassment and financial 
crimes commonly associated with cybercrime, human/sex trafficking (both of adults and 
minors), and child pornography have nearly unlimited boundaries to persist as criminal 
enterprises via computers and digital networks. From contemporary slave trading, to 
soliciting at-risk youths via social media and “Craigslist” or “Backpage.com” websites, to 
the exchange of horrible media depicting the victimization of children, the supply for this 
type of criminality seems to be ready to meet the demand with the assistance of tech- 
savvy bad guys exploiting inflexible laws and methods. 
The ability to define, understand, and resolve all these criminal cases, from the 
basic computer competence required to understand the problem to clearly identified and 
current lines of communication with all the state and federal agencies combatting this 
issue, just do not seem to be present in many agencies (Fair, 2005). In spite of the 
prolific nature of cybercrime, agencies do not seem to place a high priority on dedicating 





effort to dedicate resources to understanding and investigating cybercrime, as well as 




In spite of the fact that it has existed for as long as there have been computers 
and networks to exploit, a clear understanding of what constitutes “cybercrime” remains 
elusive. This is a unique phenomenon in the criminal justice system, where legal 
statutes and the elements required to violate those statutes are carefully written. 
Homicide, for example, involves a person causing the death of another person with a 
range of sub-categories and offense levels that are dependent on culpable mental 
states and other factors (“Criminal Homicide,” 2013).  Even though titles, certain 
mitigating information and punishment ranges vary from state to state, there is still a 
pretty clear understanding of what that offense is. 
This is not the case with cybercrime. The definition itself of cybercrime has never 
been as clearly established as say, burglary or murder. Obviously this makes 
investigating and prosecuting these kinds of incidents highly problematic (Brenner, 
2007a). Cybercrime can be defined as simplistically as offenses committed using 
networked information systems, but that vagueness potentially includes almost the 
entire range of criminal behavior (Brenner, 2007a). Cyber terrorism, cyber warfare, 
cyber stalking, cyber bullying, all involve the use of networked information systems, and 
not only the elements of these offenses but critical jurisdictional issues that define 






Even when the offenses and jursdiction are established, the ability for the agency 
with jurisdiction to pursue offenders is limited (Brenner, 2007a). This is probably one of 
the most fundamental problems in dealing with cybercrime. Three categories that 
cybercrime can fall under, however, are not offense titles in themselves, but they 
encompass a series of criminal offenses that may or may not always constitute a cyber- 
offense. These categories are: offenses where the information network or system itself 
is the target of the attack, as in a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack; offenses 
where a computer or network is used to perpetrate crime, as in identity theft or 
credit/debit card abuse offenses; and offenses where the computer or network is used 
incidentally, as in cyber bullying/harassment or stalking (Nhan, 2008). An interesting 
evolution of these categories is that technology has increased the versatility with which 
these crimes are committed and led to the development of entirely new computer 
crimes like online impersonation (“Computer Crimes,” 2013). Given that the criminality 
of these offenses depends on clearly articulated statutory language, investigating and 
prosecuting these cases will continue to be a losing proposition without more concrete 
legal definitions. 
Even where offenses are clearly written, in too many cases the statute itself has 
not kept pace with the technology used to commit the offense. In Texas, for example, 
the current offense of harassment still mentions the use of outdated and nearly obsolete 
technologies such as pagers and facsimile machines, but it fails entirely to specify the 
more probable manners in which this offense could be electronically perpetrated, with 
computer accounts and social media networks (“Disorderly Conduct,” 2013). The statute 





While this is still technically possible with some old phone systems, it is largely a 
remnant of analog telephony and this open line problem has been resolved with the 
almost near universal adoption of digital telephony and ubiquity of cellular smart 
phones, where even the person receiving the call can terminate the call and disconnect. 
This is just one example of the language of a criminal statute being tweaked over time 
to include some mention of technological advances, but which has utterly failed to keep 
pace with technology (Fukuchi, 2011). 
It is a commonly held belief in law enforcement that the best opportunity to 
describe an initial crime scene and preserve evidence rests with the first responder. In 
practical terms, this means the patrol officer who either responds to a call, proactively 
discovers a crime in progress or evidence of one, or who is working at a departmental 
information or intake desk where citizens walk in and file reports. These officers need 
training in and awareness of a multitude of potential crimes, both to determine if an 
actual offense was committed and to know how to process what if any crime scene 
exists. 
The investigation of cybercrime is no different. What has been discovered, 
however, is that patrol officers often lack not only the awareness of cybercrime but the 
skills to conduct an initial investigation on such offenses (Bossler, 2012). This skill 
includes specific things to look for in an investigation as how to power down information 
systems and digital devices of evidentiary value, documenting these items in place prior 
to seizure, and the packaging, transport and storage of these items after seizure. Other 
cybercrimes, like cyber harassment, online impersonation, and stalking might require 





billing statements or call histories, and even knowing how to search for metadata on 
digital photographs. Even basic computer literacy is a critical component for first 
responders in terms of investigation but happens to be acknowledged by officers as a 
need for improvement (Bossler, 2012). 
Another potential improvement that could be made in terms of investigation of 
cybercrime could be in the assignment of these cases for follow up. This might require a 
multi-pronged approach. Many law enforcement agencies with specialized criminal 
investigation units are still organized along traditionally grouped offense types. A 
medium sized agency might have a crimes against persons section, crimes against 
property, vice/narcotics, major case unit (dealing with aggravated and sexually 
assaultive offenses, robbery and homicide) and youth offenses where the 
victim/offenders are underage. These categories involve many different offenses that 
could be reported and investigated but are routed for follow up investigation according 
to similar characteristics. 
Youth offenses as a specific unit, however, could present a viable model for 
cybercrime routing/assignment. Not counting status offenses like underage possession 
of alcohol/tobacco, being a runaway, truancy, et cetera, the offenses investigated by a 
typical youth offenses unit are based on the same statutes as those investigated by any 
other. The difference is the age of the offender or victim. In the case of a juvenile victim, 
there are protections and procedures in place that make resolution of some of these 
cases unique, as well enhanced punishments for the offenders. In the cases of juvenile 





Grouping cybercrimes and routing them for investigative follow-up according to 
defined similarities could help agencies track patterns as well as statistics more 
accurately. This could be accomplished by modifying whatever records management or 
reporting system is in place for an agency. The broad range of such systems used 
requires those changes to be made at vendor or end-user levels, but separating 
cybercrimes from other similar crimes committed by traditional means would not only 
help law enforcement get a better sense of the scope of cybercrime, it would help 
officers focus on this category of crime and could even create a niche for investigators at 
a local level who demonstrate aptitude. This is clearly a desired goal and not a current 
state of affairs, as existing research indicates that not only are officers unaware            
of the scope of cybercrime in their jurisdictions (Bossler, 2012), but many agencies have 
no dedicated cybercrime units (Fair, 2005). Nevertheless, training line officers to react 
appropriately to alleged crimes and process evidence is a good idea. Similarly, 
dedicating resources to a significant crime problem and modifying organizational 
structure to support that effort reflects an agency committed to reducing that crime 
problem. 
As indicated above, one major obstacle with the investigation and prosecution of 
cybercrime is the extent to which the commission of the offenses blur jurisdictional 
boundaries. Local law enforcement agencies are especially constrained by these 
boundaries, and pursuing an offender across county, state, or even international 
borders to resolve criminal cases of varying severity may just not always be possible. 
Some significant challenges are also present in terms of the evidentiary burdens 





of these reasons, it is important that agencies improve coordination with each other both 
locally and at federal/international levels. Establishing these paths of communication 
and making sure they stay viable can make easier the passing of a case to an agency 
with a greater chance of prosecuting it successfully, even if the jurisdictional issues 
cannot be resolved. 
Coordination need not be limited to the law enforcement arm of the criminal 
justice system. Police agencies and prosecutors should interact with legislators and 
work to create or modify laws in ways that shift some of the evidentiary burden to the 
accused (Fukuchi, 2011), forcing them to affirmatively defend the charges against them. 
Currently, the “overwhelming evidentiary burdens” required to prove cybercrime cases 
frequently make them not worth the expense and effort in a triage-based prosecutorial 
system or simply impossible (Fukuchi, 2011, p. 291). Unless improvements are made in 
this area, the problem will continue. 
Cybercrime, by its nature, involves offenders using networks, software, websites, 
and other services that they do not own. Their activities are often tracked or logged as a 
matter of course or even as a function of the fundamental principles of networking, 
albeit in a more raw and less easily interpreted form at that level. With that in mind, it 
seems counterintuitive that such a difficulty in investigating suspects and offenders 
would persist. Reasons why include privacy issues, liability attached to those entities for 
voluntarily releasing subscriber or other information, and even procedures used by law 






Procedures for obtaining search warrants once probable cause has been 
obtained are in place, but timelines for obtaining and the execution of a search warrant 
for digital information compared to the retention periods for that information are 
inconsistent at best. Routing such requests for information to the correct person at a 
third party company can be very tedious and some companies might even make 
locating the contact information for that person intentionally difficult. If probable cause 
has not been established for the sake of an evidentiary search warrant, the problem is 
even greater. 
A Grand Jury subpoena for records or information is an alternative to a search 
warrant, but given that they are issued by Grand Juries the availability of this alternative 
for the investigation of misdemeanor cybercrimes is not guaranteed. Especially with the 
proliferation of cyber harassment, and online impersonation crimes (which are 
misdemeanors unless specific penalty enhancement criteria are met), it is currently 
difficult or even impossible to prove up these crimes and identify or charge an offender 
(“Computer Crimes,” 2013; “Disorderly Conduct,” 2013). 
The best possible way to fix this problem is for all stakeholders in cybercrime 
reduction to lobby for the legislative change that will give these cases a chance to be 
investigated. One example might be some kind of “implied consent” law requiring all 
internet companies to include in their Terms of Service an agreement for account 
holders to authorize the company to release limited information to law enforcement 






Traditional workflow of law enforcement agencies and investigative units is 
motivated by solvability (Nhan, 2008). Solvability involves a subjective determination 
based on several factors that an offender can be identified, charged, and prosecuted. 
Some law enforcement entities have attempted to reduce solvability into objective 
scores, but the inclusion of factors into the solvability process (such as witnesses, 
evidence collected, known suspect, vehicle information, NCIC/TCIC entries or hits, 
etc…) and the weight each of those factors has on a case remains subjective. 
At the local law enforcement level, investigative units are overburdened and can 
rarely assign 100% of the cases they review and so must prioritize the ones they do 
assign according to a determination of that solvability.  Problems with jurisdictional 
authority/responsibility in cybercrime cases dramatically lowers the probability of these 
cases being finally solved (disposed of), which in turn lowers their priority in assignment 
and follow up (Brenner, 2007b). That said, nontraditional methods of addressing 
frequent and focused crimes has been successful, even those methods that are more 
intent on prevention and intervention than reaction and prosecution (Scott, 2007). 
Methods include partnering with community leaders and directly interacting with those 
who are at risk to offend (Scott, 2007), and increasing the stake the community holds in 
preventing/solving the problem (Nhan, 2008). This might be more problematic in 
international cybercrime prevention, at least from the perspective of a typically policed 
community; but education, resource sharing, and coordinated defensive measures at 





As previously stated, leaving case management and investigation at the status 
quo for the sake of pure solvability may not be the best option. An argument against 
devoting time, personnel, and training resources to investigating cybercrime and even 
impacting legislation is budgetary. It simply costs money to train officers, and training 
them on information systems or specialized investigative techniques can be extremely 
expensive. Technology is ever changing, so an investment in training entire 
departments on competence with computer systems and networks and how to look at 
them investigatively could be cost prohibitive. When balanced against the still-low 
probability of solving these crimes, on the surface, it could be considered a bad financial 
decision to implement such sweeping changes. 
That said, the financial cost and the human impact of cybercrime indicate that it 
may be too expensive not to implement change. Media outlets regularly report suicides 
that are directly attributed to cyber harassment or bullying. Homicides where victims are 
targeted via social media or online personal ads have been reported (Philip Markoff, 
n.d.; Caufield, 2014). 
While the full extent of financial cybercrime is not known, what financial impact is 
known is of great concern. Perpetrators of identity theft, which is only one of the many 
financial crimes that can be grouped under cybercrime, victimized over sixteen million 
US citizens in 2012, for a financial impact of $24.7 billion (Harrell, 2013). Many of these 
people were victimized more than once, and in about 91% of the cases no suspect or 
offender information was obtained  (Harrell, 2013). That is a very small snapshot of the 
entire problem, and when cybercrimes resulting in debit and credit card abuse and the 





taken into account, the amount of loss in the US each year dwarfs the entire gross 
domestic product of some countries  (“List of Countries,” n.d.). 
There is also no requirement that law enforcement agencies implement costly 
changes all at once with 100% of their personnel. Tiered training programs over several 
years would doubtless still have positive impacts, as would ongoing coordination with 
other criminal justice entities. The cost of these programs could be spread out over 
time, making it that much more affordable. 
RECOMMENDATION 
 
It is absolutely critical that the criminal justice system gets better at investigating 
and prosecuting cybercrime. The only way to do this is to dedicate more resources and 
personnel to understanding it, defining it, clearly criminalizing it, and making the cases 
solvable. Updating statutes to reflect the manner in which the crimes are actually 
committed is a step in that direction. It would be anachronistic for the current definition 
of aggravated assault to include the use of a flintlock pistol; yet harassment and other 
statutes still retain language of obsolete (or “merely” antiquated) technology. 
Ensuring that first responders and follow-up investigators have the necessary 
tools to work these cases is another step. Coordinating with prosecutors and legislators 
to shift evidentiary burdens to the accused and making it possible for law enforcement 
to obtain information related to the crimes from third parties could be of great help. 
Lastly, coordinating with agencies locally, at the federal and international level to 
establish clear cross-jurisdictional means of assistance and responsibility, and then 
keeping those lines open, could only help those in criminal justice fight this type of 





training of their officers on computer literacy, cybercrime-scene processing, and digital 
forensics a very high priority. It is also recommended that agencies organize these 
types of crimes and route them to dedicated personnel, so those with more experience 
and better training will have a greater chance to solve the cases, and in order to better 
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